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In a behavioral view, the purposes of science are primarily prediction and control. To the extent that a
scientist embraces both of these as a unified and generally applicable criterion for science, certain phil-
osophical and theoretical practices are counterproductive, including mentalism in both its metaphysical
and metatheoretical forms. It is possible and often worthwhile to recast some mentalistic talk into an
issue of behavior-behavior relations. When behavior-behavior relations are approached non-mechanisti-
cally, however, analysis cannot stop at the level of the relations themselves. Several analytic concepts
common in the behavioral community share some ofthe dangers ofmentalism ifnot employed properly,
including such concepts as self-reinforcement, response-produced stimulation, and self-rules.
Criticism of a behavioral approach to
human behavior has been frequent since
its inception. Recently, a type ofcriticism
has emerged from knowledgeable critics
suggesting that there is a more rapid path
to the kinds ofscientific knowledge sought
by behaviorists (e.g., Keat, 1972; Wes-
sells, 1981, 1982). Even individuals who
formerly have been sympathetic to a be-
havior-analytic position have embraced
this line of criticism. For example, Kil-
leen has suggested that we need to "re-
store the excitement" in our field by ad-
mitting mentalism (Killeen, 1984).
Behavorists would enthusiastically
embrace this suggestion if the alterna-
tives being proposed (e.g., Killeen's
"emergent behaviorism," 1984) ad-
vanced the goals of science as seen by
behavior analysts. Sadly, that possibility
does not appear likely. Instead, the critics
seem to be proposing a kind of science
that is ill-suited to the scientific ends
sought by behavior analysts. Although the
criticisms may seem to be about scientific
strategies or tactics, in actuality they con-
cern the behavior-analytic view of sci-
entific explanation itself.
The nature of the recent criticism sug-
gests that it may be worthwhile to reex-
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amine some of the philosophical under-
pinnings of a behavior-analytic view of
science. Many of the points we hope to
make have been made elsewhere, but the
discussions have often been directed to-
ward other specific concerns and have
not always been interconnected or given
a comprehensive rationale. Keystones of
a behavior-analytic position can then ap-
pear to be dogmatic or arbitrary, rather
than required for the intellectual integrity
of the position.
Our starting point will be the primary
purposes of science from a behavior-an-
alytic viewpoint-prediction and con-
trol. We will attempt to show that an
emphasis on prediction and control is not
arbitrary in behavior analysis because it
is a necessary part of successful forms of
the philosophy that underlies behavior-
analytic theorizing. We will examine
mentalism from several vantage points
and show that regardless of its form,
mentalism is necessarily counterproduc-
tive to the purposes of science embraced
by behavior analysts. Mentalism can,
however, contribute to the purposes of
science as seen from other perspectives.
We will examine a behavioral translation
of some types of mental phenomena in
terms ofbehavior-behavior relations, but
warn against uses of the translation that
also interfere with the accomplishment
of prediction and control. We will then
briefly examine several concepts within
a behavioral perspective that are on a
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slippery slope to the same problem cre-
ated by mentalism.
THE PURPOSES OF SCIENCE:
PREDICTION AND CONTROL
When differences in goals are made ev-
ident, many arguments seem to dissolve.
The goals of science from a behavior-
analytic viewpoint have been quite ex-
plicitly stated: "We undertake to predict
and control the behavior of the individ-
ual organism. This is our 'dependent
variable'-the effect for which we are to
find the cause" (Skinner, 1953, p. 35). It
seems only fair to evaluate a position with
respect to the goals it sets for itself, while
recognizing ofcourse that other purposes
might be well served by different posi-
tions.
The Emphasis on Control
Prediction and control are the primary
goals of behavior analysis (the goals of
interpretation and explanation are dis-
cussed later). The behavioral approach
places emphasis on the words "and con-
trol" in the phrase "prediction and con-
trol." Behavior analysis has sought an
explanation ofbehavior in terms ofevents
that are ofa kind that at least potentially
allows both prediction and control si-
multaneously. As we discuss below, some
kinds of descriptions of events and re-
lations can in principle only directly pro-
duce successful prediction and not con-
trol. Other kinds ofdescriptions ofevents
and relations can allow both, in principle,
though of course for practical reasons
control may presently be impossible. Be-
havior analysis is committed to empha-
sizing this latter kind of analysis.
The importance ofprediction and con-
trol as a guide to behavior-analytic theo-
rizing cannot be overemphasized. It is
the key to understanding many behav-
ioral positions that might otherwise ap-
pear to be arbitrary. For example, be-
havior-analytic accounts of behavior are
always ultimately to be cast in terms of
"environmental variables" or "external
variables": "Our 'independent vari-
ables'-the causes of behavior-are the
external conditions of which behavior is
a function" (Skinner, 1953, p. 35). This
position is not based on an a priori dic-
tum that only what are commonly called
"external variables" can possibly influ-
ence behavior. In a sense, the flow is in
the opposite direction. Ifan event can in
principle directly allow both prediction
and control of behavior, then it deserves
the name "environmental variable" or
"external variable." This relation can be
shown by the fact that, in behavior anal-
ysis, the words "external" or "environ-
mental" do not always refer to the world
outside the skin: rather they refer to the
world outside behavior (most of which,
of course, is outside the skin). For ex-
ample, it is sometimes useful ("useful"
in terms of prediction and control) to
think of an "internal environment" in-
fluencing behavior.
An emphasis on "external variables"
comes from the goals ofscience as viewed
by behavior analysis. Seeking both pre-
diction and control puts certain con-
straints on the kinds of statements of re-
lations that are useful for the scientist.
Only statements that point to events ex-
ternal to the behavior of the individual
organism being studied can directly lead
to prediction and control. The logic of
this claim is as follows. Scientific state-
ments, as Skinner pointed out, are not
themselves the causes of the phenomena
they encompass. Bodies do not fall, for
example, because of the law of gravity.
Rather humans can bring their behavior
under the control ofthis verbal statement
of a relation (i.e., this rule) and achieve
certain ends. Thus, scientific rules help
us accomplish particular ends by describ-
ing contingencies. They are rules for sci-
entists, not rules for the world. Thus, sci-
entists who seek prediction and control
must rely on rules that start with the en-
vironment, in the sense of the "world
outside of the behavior," because scien-
tists are, and can only ever be, in other
organisms' environment in this sense.
Scientists cannot directly use a rule to
control behavior unless it starts where
the scientist is-in the potentially man-
ipulable world outside of the behavioral
system. If a scientific statement is used
by the scientist to control phenomena but
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does not itself start from where the sci-
entist resides there must be some un-
specified and unanalyzed link between the
statement and the scientist's behavior. It
may be useful, but it is necessarily in-
complete in the sense that the rule itself
did not specify whatever was done to
control the phenomena of interest.
Why Prediction Must Be Included and
Control Emphasized
Much of the confusion over a behav-
ior-analytic perspective on the goals of
science would have vanished had control
alone been emphasized as the defining
property of science. To the extent that
control is pursued, it forces us to em-
phasize external variables that are func-
tionally related to the behavior. Indeed,
ifthe critics ofa behavioral position were
right and the emphasis on control rep-
resented merely an emphasis on tech-
nological advancement, there would have
been no reason not to emphasize control
alone as the issue. The criticism is a fairly
common one. For example, Wessells
(198 1) objects to an emphasis on control,
saying "the kinds ofpredictions one aims
to make need not be dictated by the prag-
matic desire to change behavior for the
better" (p. 161). The concern over con-
trol, however, is not primarily with the
development of technology, though the
technological outgrowth of behavior
analysis is impressive and a legitimate
source of intellectual support for the po-
sition. At a theoretical level, the concern
is primarily with the completeness ofthe
account according to the scientific goals
embraced by behavior analysis. A be-
havior-analytic position on the goals of
science in turn derives its dignity from
the necessary relation between these par-
ticular goals and the overall philosophi-
cal integrity of the world view repre-
sented by behavior analysis (cf. Reese,
1984).
Behavior analysis is based on a per-
vasive use of a particular explanatory
model: the "act in context." In behavior
analysis, any event is to be understood
and even defined through a contextual
analysis. The three-term contingency of
radical behaviorism is a dynamic spatio-
temporal contextual unit-none of the
terms can be defined independently of
any of the others. Radical behaviorism
is so thoroughgoing in its attempt to ana-
lyze context that even the behavior of
scientists as they conduct contextual
analyses is to be understood through more
contextual analyses (Skinner, 1945).
The explanatory model of the "act in
context" is shared by many perspectives
on behavior, from certain forms of evo-
lutionary biology (e.g., Dawkins, 1982),
to some types of cultural anthropology
(e.g., Harris, 1979), to Marxism. Because
a basic explanatory model (or "root met-
aphor") is at the core of any well-inte-
grated and consistent world view, Pepper
(1942) has suggested that all perspectives
that rely on the "act in context" as an
explanatory model be thought ofas types
of the world view he calls "contextual-
ism." According to Pepper (1942), the
underlying "truth criterion" of contex-
tualism is "successful working" or prag-
matism (Pepper, 1942). A term, concept,
or statement of a relation is not true or
false simply according to public agree-
ment about the correspondence between
it and other events, but according to the
impact that the use of the term, concept,
or statement has on dealing successfully
with the phenomena of interest. Radical
behaviorism clearly encompasses such a
view (e.g., Skinner, 1945).
The nature of contextualism and of
other world views, in Pepper's fullest
sense, is a complicated topic. It would
take us beyond the scope of this paper to
defend fully the claim that behavior anal-
ysis fits all of Pepper's defining charac-
teristics for contextualism (but see Hayes
& Reese, in press). For our purposes, we
will refer to behavior analysis as a type
of contextualism only in the limited and
uncontroversial sense of a view of the
world consistently based on an analysis
ofthe spatiotemporal context ofacts, and
driven by a pragmatic theory of truth.
The problem with the "act in context"
as an explanatory model is that it does
not and cannot specify the scope of the
act or the context. Context can proceed
outward spatially to include all ofthe uni-
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verse. Context can proceed backward in
time infinitely to include the remotest an-
tecedent, or forward in time to include
the most delayed consequence. The "act"
in question can vary from the finest mus-
cle twitch to the most elaborate and ex-
tended behavioral sequence. Conse-
quently, in behavior analysis, an operant
can be of almost any size and, in prin-
ciple, can be influenced by contingencies
that are extremely remote or indirect.
Under such circumstances, one might ask
how we are to know that a particular con-
textual analysis (in behavior analysis, a
particular "contingency analysis") is ad-
equate?
"Successful working" provides an an-
swer to this question. An analysis need
proceed only to the point at which suc-
cessful action can be based on it. Suc-
cessful action confirms the value of the
analysis-it changes the indeterminent
units of contingency analysis in the ab-
stract into the determined units ofa given
instance of successful contingency anal-
ysis. In behavior analysis, the name for
such successful working is "prediction
and control." We know that a given event
should be called a discriminative stim-
ulus, for example, because the effects of
doing so are that we can deal more suc-
cessfully with the behavior of interest.
While prediction alone provides some
confirmation of the value of an analysis,
only control "proves" that the units we
have selected (the divisions we have made
in context and behavior) are valid. One
could ask, for example, how do we know
that this is the relevant stimulus for this
behavior? The answer is of the general
form that when we change this stimulus
(and not that stimulus), we get a change
in this behavior (and not that behavior).
Without manipulation, the units we se-
lect could be completely mistaken. Be-
cause the explanatory model in behavior
analysis does not and cannot specify the
precise nature ofthese units a priori, this
would present a grave problem. Without
manipulation, we could guess, for ex-
ample, that event X is a discriminative
stimulus, but instead it could be part of
event Y and not a separate event at all,
or it could covary with behavior due to
coincidence, or the wrong construction
could have been placed on the proper
units of behavior and thus on its ante-
cedents, and so on. It is primarily the
confirmation of the validity of the units
of the analysis that requires that control
be emphasized in successful forms of
contextualism.
An additional problem in behavior
analysis (or any contextualistic perspec-
tive) is that even the behavior of a sci-
entist analyzing behavior is itself behav-
ior that can be analyzed. Contextual
analysis can easily be paralyzed, how-
ever, by the need to analyze context, and
then to analyze the context ofthe analysis
of context, and so on ad infinitum. Pre-
diction and control both confirm the val-
ue of the analysis and provide an end-
point to the need for analysis-it need
continue only to the point at which pre-
diction and control is possible in prin-
ciple. Without control as an endpoint,
behavior analysis could be caught up in
an intellectual whirlpool of infinite
regressions ofever more massive contex-
tual analyses and would lose contact with
"successful working" as its truth crite-
rion. The argument can be made that the
relative lack of empirical work springing
from J. R. Kantor's extremely contex-
tualistic view of psychology shows what
can happen ifcontextualists let go ofcon-
trol as a primary goal of science. It is the
successful operation ofcontextualism that
pragmatically requires that control be
emphasized-it is not a postulate of the
philosophy.
Ifwe have explained why control must
be emphasized as a goal of science in be-
havior analysis, why should prediction
be included at all as a goal? There are two
reasons. First, prediction is pragmatical-
ly useful and thus naturally part of the
truth criterion ofcontextualism. It would
be arbitrary to exclude it. Second, control
cannot be the only proximate outcome
of successful science, because technical
limitations often exist on our ability to
manipulate events. Predictive relation-
ships are not by their nature incomplete
when prediction is based upon variables
that are in the domain in which the po-
tential for control exists because in prin-
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ciple they can provide a complete ac-
count. They take us outside the behavioral
system. Whether they in fact do provide
a complete account in a specific instance
can be assessed as additional techniques
allow direct manipulation and as addi-
tional knowledge creates networks of
mutually supportive observations.
Critics ofthe goals ofscience embraced
by behavior analysis have often misun-
derstood the basis for these goals and the
integral role they play in behavior anal-




Wessells (198 1) has objected to the cri-
terion ofcontrol by pointing out that "be-
havioral control can be achieved in the
absence of explanation and vice versa"
(p. 161). Astronomy is a commonly used
example (Martin, 1978; Wessells, 1981)
because we cannot test astronomical
principles based on our ability to control
cosmic events. The literal meaning ofex-
planation comes from the same root as
the word "plane" -literally, explanation
means to lay out flat before us. According
to the behavior-analytic position, "ex-
planation" ultimately refers to prediction
and control with adequate scope and pre-
cision. Thus, seen from the standpoint of
behavior analysis, Wessell's statement is
at least partially incorrect. We cannot
have control in a sophisticated manner
without what behaviorists take to be "ex-
planation." With thorough and general
control must also come prediction, and
to a behaviorist, prediction and control
of sufficient scope and precision is "ex-
planation" -it is how behaviorists "lay
out" behavioral systems. Control that is
limited in scope and precision does not,
of course, justify the term "explanation"
and in that sense Wessell's observation
seems obviously valid. The observation
that pointing a gun at people and saying
"Your money or your life" will often con-
trol monetary exchange is hardly an ex-
planation ofcharitable giving. Such coer-
cion fails as an explanation for monetary
contributions in general because it has
insufficient scope: a wide variety of in-
stances are not encompassed by the "ex-
planation."
Behavior analysts also agree that at
times science can have explanation with-
out control. Skinner uses the term "in-
terpretation" to describe such cases. It
occurs when a system can be thoroughly
described, but for technical reasons con-
trol is not possible. Even then, behav-
iorists insist that an adequate explana-
tion or interpretation be based on events
that are of the same kind as those per-
mitting control. As we have emphasized
above, this insistence is not an arbitrary
component ofbehavior analysis. It is also
consistent with the strategy ofthe natural
sciences under such circumstances. Mod-
em astronomy, for example, is based
fundamentally on the controlled obser-
vations ofthe physicist, and the observa-
tions are of the same kind. Someday we
may even manipulate cosmic events. The
limitations that occur in astronomy are
technical, not problems with the kinds of
events themselves.
The Mechanistic View ofExplanation
This view of explanation can be con-
trasted with others that are popular in
psychology. To put the best face on it
from the point of view of behavior anal-
ysis, some forms of cognitivism are use-
fully considered as efforts to describe the
structure of behavior (Catania, 1973). A
description of the structure of behavior,
however, is a description ofthe phenom-
ena to be explained. Knowing the phe-
nomena to be explained is vital, but it
must not be mistaken for a contextual
explanation of these very phenomena.
The distinction is critical because if be-
havioral events are orderly, they them-
selves can allow prediction ofbehavioral
phenomena, without ever going outside
the particular behavioral system. This is
not adequate behavior analytic expla-
nation even though in a more limited
sense it clearly can be useful. No amount
of description of behavioral events will
directly provide for control ofbehavioral
events in the same individual. To think
otherwise is to make the "structuralist
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error" (Skinner, 1974). We cannot con-
trol the behavior of an individual with-
out considering events other than the be-
havior of that individual.
Thus, the cognitivist agenda does not
necessarily meet the goals of science ac-
cording to behavior analysis. Cognitiv-
ists themselves have no quarrel with this
point: "Most [cognitive] investigators
agree that their current theories are de-
scriptive and that an explanatory theory,
which would accommodate the effects of
the environment, is a distal goal" (Wes-
sells, 1982, p. 77). Just as it is unfair,
however, to criticize behavior analysis
without considering its goals and under-
lying philosophy, so too it is unfair to
criticize cognitive perspectives in the
same manner. Cognitivists do not believe
that they are confusing description and
explanation. Nor do they believe that the
lack ofconcern for control is a weakness.
They are correct in both instances, but
only in the context of their own under-
lying philosophical position.
Most, though not all, forms of a cog-
nitive account of behavior seem to be
based on the world view of mechanism
(cf. Pepper, 1942). The fundamental ex-
planatory model ofmechanism is that of
the machine. The type of cognitive theo-
rizing that is based on computer meta-
phors and uses computer simulations to
test the adequacy and operating charac-
teristics of various theoretical models is
obviously mechanistic in this sense. We
will limit our discussion of cognitivism
to this mechanistic variety. (Some forms
ofbehaviorism are also mechanistic, but
not radical behaviorism. A detailed dis-
cussion ofthis is beyond the scope ofthis
paper, but see Hayes & Reese, in press.)
In accord with its explanatory model, a
mechanist shows no hesitation in ex-
plaining a behavioral system by speci-
fying the component parts ofits structure
and the nature of its orderly operation;
just as a person examining a car would
readily explain its action by an appeal to
its component parts (e.g., pistons, spark
plugs) and structural organization (e.g.,
the spark plug wire is connected to the
spark plug). In mechanism, each part can
be described independently of the others
and the nature ofthe parts does not change
when they are combined into systems.
The conditions that gave rise to this
structure or the ways we can manipulate
it are irrelevant to the description of the
operation ofthe machine and predictions
based on this description.
Mechanism has a correspondence-
based truth criterion (Pepper, 1942). A
term, concept, or statement ofrelation is
true to the extent that we can agree that
it corresponds with events. This presents
particular restrictions to mechanistic the-
ories. It would be improper to develop a
description of a system based on close
contact with it and then to treat this as
an adequate theory ofthe system because
obviously any detailed and careful de-
scription of events will be in close cor-
respondence with these very same events.
Correspondence can be used to test the
adequacy of theories or concepts only by
applying them to new situations, that is,
by deductive prediction. The more ab-
stract the relation between the original
situation, the theory, and the new situ-
ation, the better (e.g., see Ericsson & Si-
mon, 1984, on this point). When we can
deductively predict with sufficient pre-
cision and scope, we have "explained"
the phenomena according to a mecha-
nistic account. The emphasis on hypo-
thetico-deductive theorizing that exists
in all mechanistic perspectives (e.g., most
forms of cognitivism and S-R theory) is
not arbitrary; it is integral to the func-
tioning of the underlying world view.
Thus, for mechanists, description and
theoretical prediction form an adequate
basis for explanation; in contrast, con-
textualists emphasize prediction and
control. These differences about ade-
quate scientific explanation correspond
with differences about the goals ofscience
according to the underlying world view.
Neither can be said to be "right" or
"wrong" because any evaluation we can
make about the adequacy of scientific
goals must itself be in terms of some set
of underlying values or goals. From the
point ofview ofcontextualism, all we can
say is that these two views ofscience may
be more or less useful for accomplishing
particular ends, or that they might have
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this or that effect on the culture that sup-
ports them. Most behaviorists probably
believe, of course, that a contextualistic
perspective has positive consequences for
scientific subcultures and perhaps the
majority culture. Evaluating truth on the
basis of consequences, however, is itself
a distinctly contextualistic line to take.
Few behaviorists would argue that be-
havior analysis is leading to better and
better hypothetico-deductive theories.
For a mechanist, this may show the in-
adequacy ofbehavior analysis. For a con-
textualist, it shows no such thing.
To summarize our main points so far:
Prediction and control are reasonable
goals for science. Together, they allow
behavior analysis to progress efficiently,
providing an adequate basis for scientific
explanation according to a contextualis-
tic perspective. Unlike prediction, con-
trol requires that we go outside of the
behavioral system itself. Sometimes even
when we do, control will be technically
impossible. For the sake of a complete
account, however, it is necessary that we
explain behavior in terms of events that
in principle allow both prediction and
control. This requirement is not due pri-
marily to a concern with technology.
Rather, it is necessary for the successful
working of the explanatory system used
in behavior analysis. Other explanatory
systems imply other kinds of scientific
goals, and alternative practices can be de-
fended on those grounds.
MENTALISM
An arena in which to examine the im-
plications ofthe preceding analysis is the
study of private events. Indeed, many of
the objections to behavior analysis are
usually cast in terms of private events
and their investigation. The dominant al-
ternative to a behavioral analysis of pri-
vate events is mentalism. Objections to
mentalism can be placed in two basic cat-
egories: metaphysical objections and
metatheoretical objections. The meta-
physical objections are directed at the
concept of literal dualism and are shared
by virtually all scientific perspectives. The
metatheoretical objections have to do
with the incompleteness of the account
mentalism engenders when measured in
terms of the goals of prediction and con-
trol. Our main point is that it is impor-
tant not to confuse these two types of
objections. Many of the behavior-ana-
lytic concerns with mentalism are meta-
theoretical objections driven by the goals
of science embraced by behavior analy-
sis, and these objections are by no means
unique to the topic of mentalism. We
show later that they apply to topics with-
in behavior analysis itself.
The Scientific Unacceptability of Literal
Dualism
Originally, psychology was the study
of the soul. The Oxford English Diction-
ary (OED) defines "soul" as "the spiritual
part of man." The OED defines "spirit"
as an "incorporeal or immaterial being"
and as a "being or intelligence distinct
from anything physical." The word
"physical" comes from a word for nature
(thus the science of physics) and is de-
fined as "of or pertaining to the phenom-
enal world of the senses; matter." Thus,
if you take the words literally, "soul" or
"spirit" are inherently dualistic terms be-
cause they oppose matter and nonmatter.
We might label this "literal dualism."
Literal dualism is the beliefthat there are
two different essences in the world-one
type exists in space and time, while the
second type is nonspatiotemporal.
This type ofliteral dualism was to some
degree transferred to the concept of
"mind" and thus to its study. The OED
defines "mind" as "the mental or psych-
ical being or faculty." An elaborating def-
inition explains that "mind" is "the seat
of a person's consciousness, thoughts,
volitions, and feelings; also, the incor-
poreal subject of the psychical faculties,
the spiritual side of a human being; the
soul as distinguished from the body ....
Mental being; opposed to matter." The
spiritual meaning of"mind" is also shown
by the fact that God has long been re-
ferred to as "mind," as for example in
the quote "That eternal infinite mind,
who made and governs all things" (Locke,
1690). Thus, in lay terms, the essence of
182 STEVEN C. HAYES & AARON J. BROWNSTEIN
the mind is fundamentally different from
the essence of the physical unvierse.
"Mind" explicitly makes contact with a
cultural tradition of literal dualism.
The objection to literal dualism is two-
fold. First, such a view is not scientifically
tenable. This objection is shared by vir-
tually all scientists, including cognitiv-
ists. By definition, nonspatiotemporal
events cannot have form, mass, accel-
eration, beginnings, or ends. How they
can be regarded as "events" in such a case
is problematic. Any event that can be
discerned is being observed in the world
ofspace and time, and must in that sense
be regarded as "physical." Literal dual-
ism also raises the impossibly difficult
issue of how nonspatiotemporal events
can cause physical events to occur.
This argument is not about terms. If
someone wanted to call all events "men-
tal," there could be no objection, though
it would distort our normal understand-
ing of the term. The concern is more di-
rected at literal dualism: "What is lacking
is the bold and exciting behavioristic hy-
pothesis that what one observes and talks
about is always the 'real' and 'physical'
world (or at least the 'one' world)" (Skin-
ner, 1945, p. 276, emphasis added). As
the last phrase in this quote shows, rad-
ical behaviorism is monistic, but not
physicalistic in the sense ofnaive realism
or related perspectives.
The second major objection to literal
dualism is that it leaves a gap in the do-
main of science. Who is to predict and
control mental events and relate them to
behavioral events if they are not in the
purview of science? (Skinner, 1953, p.
258). This objection is a metatheoretical
one, and it applies equally forcefully to
mentalistic theorizing that explicitly de-
nies dualism.
Mental Physiology
For the above reasons, virtually all sci-
entists avoid obvious forms of literal
dualism in their scientific work. A variety
of linguistic practices, however, have the
same metatheoretical problems as literal
dualism. One such practice is the creation
of a pseudophysiological analysis to re-
placed literal dualism (Skinner, 1969, pp.
280-284).
It is very popular to use the word
"mind" to mean "brain." Television
shows or magazine articles on the action
of the human brain, for example, are al-
most always said to be about "the human
mind." Cognitive psychology has made
no bones about the connection. A recent
authoritative text on cognitive psychol-
ogy asserted that in cognitive psychology
"the contemporary view [is] that mental
processes are synonymous with brain
processes" (Ellis & Hunt, 1983, p. 11).
Study of the brain and the nervous sys-
tem is, of course, worthwhile and rele-
vant to a behavioral analysis. But it is no
less troublesome simply to substitute the
word "brain" for "mind" and then to
engage in precisely the same kinds of
analyses as before.
Cognitivists use talk of the brain for
two purposes. One is simply to claim that
"mental functioning is not a mysterious,
nonphysical event" (Ellis & Hunt, 1983,
p. 7), that is, to emphasize the rejection
of literal dualism. The second reason is
more subtle. As we have described above,
in the kind of hypothetico-deductive
theorizing naturally promoted by mech-
anism, there is no requirement that terms
used in the analysis of events refer to
other events outside the original domain
of interest. In order that there can be a
proper division of labor among the sci-
ences, however, scientists must take a
complete scientific account to the point
at which the determinants ofa given phe-
nomenon are themselves being analyzed
by other scientists.
In psychology, contextualism naturally
does this because it leads to the identi-
fication of events outside the behavioral
system, as we have already discussed.
These events are themselves to be ex-
plained by others. Behavior analysis, for
example, does not attempt to understand
how operant chamber key lights work. It
is enough to known the conditions under
which key lights can function as stimuli.
The study of electrical lights is turned
over to another science. Conversely,
mechanism (though it need not do so)
MENTALISM AND SCIENCE 183
can leave a hole in the fabric of science
because scientifically adequate analyses
from this perspective can stay entirely
inside the original domain. Behavioral
events, or processes inferred from them,
can be explained by other behavioral
events, or processes inferred from them.
Although philosophically permissible in
mechanism, this kind of circularity is in-
tuitively unappealling, even to cognitiv-
ists.
By appearing to study brain processes,
however, cognitive psychologists can
identify causes that appear to go outside
ofthe behavioral system itself. Cognitive
psychology can superficially present itself
under the umbrella of the neurosciences.
Ifwe actually understood how the struc-
ture ofthe nervous system was influenced
by events, and exactly how any current
structure produced behavior, we would
indeed have one type of complete ac-
count (in fact, one quite comfortable to
mechanists). But studying behavioral ac-
tivity called "mental" is no more inher-
ently a study of the brain than studying
any behavioral activity. In order to main-
tain a proper division of labor among
sciences, the connection between brain
and mental activity would have to be
studied explicitly. It is clear that cogni-
tivists do not actually intend to study the
brain or its connection with mental ac-
tivity:
Of course, brain activity can be studied physiolog-
ically, but cognitive psychologists use a different
approach. Since the brain activity ofinterest cannot
be directly observed (for example, we have no idea
what happens in the brain when a person remem-
bers a grandmother), we must infer the existence of
these processes and then describe the processes in
abstract language. (Ellis & Hunt, 1983, p. 7)
In summary, mental activity can be
thought of as nonspatiotemporal activi-
ty, in which case it steps outside of sci-
ence altogether. It may be thought of as
a brain activity, but then psychologists
sometimes act as if we need not explain
how the structure of this activity itself
came to be. There is a third way to view
"mental activity," however-as behav-
ior.This is the view taken by radical be-
haviorism, to which we now turn.
Mental Activity as Private Behavior
Watson and "behavior." "Behavior"
is commonly taken to refer to a certain
subset of organismic action. For exam-
ple, it is quite typical to hear theorists
speak of "thoughts, feelings, and behav-
ior" as if behavior can be easily distin-
guished from events called "thoughts" or
"feelings."
Confusion over this issue can in part
be attributed to Watson. Watson's (1925)
behaviorism had both methodological
and metaphysical components. His
methodological behaviorism essentially
said that scientists must be behaviorists
because science can only deal with the
publicly observable. Thus, even though
other kinds of human action may exist,
we can only deal with behavior because
only behavior is publicly observable. This
position might be thought ofas implicitly
dualistic because it recognizes that be-
havior is only a subset of organismic ac-
tivity, and encourages a study that is nec-
essarily incomplete since science can only
deal with that subset, rather than the en-
tire set, due to rules of proper scientific
methodology.
Watson also made a second, somewhat
contradictory point. He seemed to say
that even if we could solve the problem
privacy presents to a scientific analysis,
behavior is still all that could be studied
because only behavior exists. Although
it is possible to read Watson to mean
simply that nonspatiotemporal events do
not exist, his emphasis on the peripheral
locus ofsuch phenomena as thinking (e.g.,
Watson, 1920, 1925) can be and was tak-
en to mean that thoughts, feelings, and
other private events are not real in their
own terms. This position can be termed
"Watsonian metaphysical behavior-
ism."
What is important to note in all ofthis
is that the use of the word "behavior"
keeps changing. In Watsonian method-
ological behaviorism, behavior is viewed
as a subset of organismic action that is
publicly observable and is therefore sub-
ject to a scientific analysis. In Watsonian
metaphysical behaviorism, behavior is
viewed as the totality of organismic ac-
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tion, but there is the implication that only
events that are publicly observable (at
least potentially) should be thought of as
real.
Radical behaviorism and "behavior."
Radical behaviorism can be distin-
guished from these other types ofbehav-
iorism in part by the view it takes in re-
gards to "behavior" and the nature of
scientific observations (Skinner, 1945,
1963). As in Watsonian metaphysical be-
haviorism, behavior is taken to be the set
of all organismic action. The word "or-
ganismic" is important. Actions by sub-
organismic units (e.g., a single neuron fir-
ing) are not usually considered to be the
behavior oforganisms, but under certain
conditions they may if they can con-
veniently be viewed as the integrated ac-
tion of a whole organism. For example,
the controlled heart rate of a person in a
biofeedback training program would
probably be thought of as the behavior
of an organism, while the beating of a
heart removed from the body clearly
would not.
Unlike earlier forms of behaviorism,
however, radical behaviorism makes no
commitment to public observability per
se as the defining characteristic of sci-
entifically valid events (Skinner, 1945).
Rather, observations are scientifically
valid or invalid based on the contingen-
cies controlling these observations. Sci-
ence is an enterprise that promotes the
development of verbal statements of re-
lations between events based on verifi-
able experience. Scientific verbal behav-
ior thus should be under the control of
the subject matter of the science and the
value of this verbal behavior is deter-
mined through the impact it has on oth-
ers attempting to come under the control
of that same subject matter.
Science attempts to restrict sources of
control over scientific observation
through the scientific method. Its pur-
pose is to ensure that scientific obser-
vations are controlled primarily by events
in the relevant subject matter and not by
states ofdeprivation, audience factors, or
similar sources ofcontrol over verbal be-
havior (Moore, 1981). Consistent with
the "successful working" truth criterion
of contextualism, the scientific value of
an observation in behavior analysis is ul-
timately determined by the degree to
which it enables prediction and control.
The essence of Skinner's (1945) criti-
cism of operationism was thus that pub-
lic agreement provides no assurance of
the proper sources of control over sci-
entific observation, nor of its pragmatic
value. Conversely, in principle, obser-
vations of private events can be tightly
controlled by these events themselves,
given the proper history, and can be high-
ly useful. In this sense, observations of
private events are no more or less sci-
entific than public events based on their
privacy per se. In radical behaviorism,
behavior can thus be defined as all ob-
servable organismic action, not all pub-
licly observable organismic action (cf.
Heidbreder, 1933, and her discussion of
the flaws of classical behaviorism). Skin-
ner (1974) has made the point quite clear-
ly:
[Radical behaviorism] does not insist upon truth
by agreement and can therefore consider events tak-
ing place in the private world within the skin. It
does not call these events unobservable, and it does
not dismiss them as subjective. (p. 16)
In this view, then, no objection can be
made to talk of events such as thinking
or feeling. This talk is not trivialized by
insisting it is only the talk itself that is
scientifically legitimate (Skinner, 1945).
A specific instance of thinking is viewed
as a scientifically accessible event- a cov-
ert behavior. We may eventually find
ways of identifying specific covert be-
haviors in others. For example, we cur-
rently have ways of knowing when re-
ports of private speech are in fact
occasioned by the specified private speech
(Hayes, 1986).
Mental Causality as Behavior-Behavior
Relation
Thoughts as behavior. One might ask:
Why insist that thinking be regarded as
covert behavior when the physical prop-
erties appear so different from overt be-
havior? Why not call thinking "mental
activity" or even a "brain process"? If
"behavior" is defined so broadly, doesn't
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this make the concept of "behavior"
meaningless? Such questions have often
been forcefully raised. For example:
The omission of [mental] states left [Skinner] with
an inadequate vocabulary, which he then expanded
by moving some stimuli inside the organism ("pri-
vate stimuli"), and by treating all other aspects of
mental states as responses. Seeing became behavior,
and imagination became "seeing without the thing
seen." But these are assertions, not demonstrated
facts. They may serve as the axioms of a parsi-
monious behavioral system, and that is largely how
Skinner used them. But they cannot then also be
used as arguments against other systems, or against
behavioral systems with augmented axioms, such
as the assumption that covert events are sufficiently
different from overt ones to deserve separate treat-
ment as a separate category ofevents. (Killeen, 1984,
p. 27)
Skinner himself (1974) is quite clear
that the issue is not one ofparsimony per
se. Asking himself how we could decide
between behavior analysis and mental-
ism, he replies:
We cannot say that one is simpler than the other
... [but] accessibility [for use in control] is another
matter. No one has ever directly modified any of
the mental activities or traits .... for most practical
purposes they are changed only through the envi-
ronment .... A decision [between the two posi-
tions] is perhaps more difficult if we simply want
to predict behavior .... [Traits] are ... useless in
control but they permit us to predict one kind of
behavior from another kind. (pp. 208-209)
Behavior-behavior relations as incom-
plete accounts. By referring to "mental
events" as behavior we do three things.
First, we eliminate consideration of
"mental events" that cannot be thought
ofas observable organismic activity, such
as purely hypothetical constructs. Sec-
ond, we emphasize that it is the task of
psychology to predict and control these
events. And third, we focus on analyses
that can accomplish these two goals. If
"mental events" are a separate category
of events, then they can be used to ex-
plain behavioral events and perhaps need
not themselves be explained by behav-
ioral scientists. Mental events that can-
not be translated into behavioral obser-
vations are particularly prone to this
problem because by definition they are
seemingly a separate category of events
from behavior. The problem can be used
as an "argument against other systems,"
but it is not a mere repetition of axioms.
It is an identification of possibly mis-
chievous contingencies over the behavior
of psychologists, one that the history of
psychology gives us every reason to take
seriously.
When a radical behaviorist is less than
enthusiastic about an account of behav-
ior that predicts that someone will re-
spond in a given way after thinking a
particular thought, it should be an ab-
sence of enthusiasm resulting from the
incompleteness ofthe account rather than
from the reference to a thought. The im-
mediate question then becomes what are
the determinants of that thought and
(even less obviously) what are the con-
tingencies that lead to a relation between
a given instance of thinking and overt
responding in this individual.
In behavior analysis, the view that
thinking causes overt behavior distills
down to the view that one behavior can
cause another. In these terms, when we
ask such questions as "What role does
thinking play in the control of behav-
ior?", we are actually asking about the
nature of a behavior-behavior relation.
Behavior-behavior relations are very im-
portant in behavior analysis in a variety
of areas, and they are as worthy of study
as is any behavior. No matter how dy-
namically one behavioral event may be
intertwined with other behavioral events
within the same individual, however, for
a contextualist a behavior-behavior re-
lation is a phenomenon to be explained
by appealing to particular contextual ar-
rangements (e.g., contingencies of rein-
forcement) that might permit prediction
and control of the behavior-behavior re-
lation itself. A behavior-behavior rela-
tion cannot be a complete explanation of
behavior, except to a mechanist, whose
world view does not insist on control as
a necessary goal of science.
"We may object, first, to the predilec-
tion for unfinished causal sequences"
(Skinner, 1969, p. 240). Killeen (1984)
has criticized this concern:
Skinner notes that after we have explained a re-
sponse in terms of mental states or activities of
feeling, we still need to explain the mental state.
But there is nothing wrong with that. Experimental
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analysis ofone of the links in a causal chain should
not necessarily be faulted because it does not in-
clude the previous ones; analysis must inevitably
stop at some point short of the Ultimate Cause."
(pp. 27-28)
For a complete account, however, be-
havior analysts must take analysis to the
point at which prediction and control are
directly possible in principle. Behavior
ofthe individual being studied can never
satisfy that criterion.
Thus, despite the fact that environ-
ment and behavior are always involved
in a dynamic interrelation, it is not ar-
bitrary (Bandura, 1978, 1981) to insist
that analysis proceed to the environmen-
tal level. An environmental cause can in
principle be used directly; given the tech-
nical ability to manipulate it, effective
action can be based on it. A rule pointing
to a behavioral "cause" might help locate
causal environmental events and rela-
tions, but it is also likely, if one is not
careful, to stop the search for causes that
could permit a complete account. Skin-
ner (1974) has said this explicitly:
It has been objected that we must stop somewhere
in following a causal chain into the past and we
may as well stop at a psychic level ... It is true that
we could trace human behavior not only to the
physical conditions which [cause it] but also to the
causes of those conditions and the causes of those
causes, almost ad infinitum, but there is no point
in going back beyond the point at which effective
action can be taken. That point is not to be found
in the psyche. (p. 210)
Thus, "the initiating action is taken by
the environment" (Skinner, 1974, p. 73,
emphasis added; see also Skinner, 1984).
Ifwe explain behavioral events in terms
of events that are in the domain of other
sciences, we move toward the compre-
hensive knowledge that we desire. But if
we explain behavioral events in terms of
other behavioral events of the same in-
dividual, then a significant gap is left to
be filled. If we will not fill it, who will?
If not now, when?
The effect of calling thinking "behav-
ior." By calling all organismic activity
appropriate to psychological study "be-
havior," we naturally inoculate ourselves
to some degree against incomplete ac-
counts. Acceptance of an incomplete
analysis is much less likely when all events
involved are clearly in the behavioral do-
main. For example, a researcher may no-
tice that many good Monopoly players
are also good poker players. Few of us
would be tempted, however, to claim that
people play poker well because they play
Monopoly well or vice versa. Both of
these actions are obviously in the behav-
ioral domain. Events outside of this do-
main must be found to explain the first
behavior, and equally important, to ex-
plain the relation between the two be-
haviors. That is, what actual events lead
to good Monopoly playing, good poker
playing, and their interrelation? This need
seems relatively clear when the two events
are obviously from the same domain. Be-
havior-behavior relations are seldom
mistaken for causal analyses adequate for
the purpose of prediction and control
when they are clearly stated as behavior-
behavior relations.
Note, however, that when behavioral
events are apparently in different do-
mains, the mistake is readily made. Ifwe
observed that good poker players feel self-
confident (not "behave self-confident-
ly"), have aggressive personalities (not
"behave aggressively"), and are intelli-
gent (not "show intelligent behavior"),
we might feel as though we have at least
a partial explanation of their skill even
though this is in principle identical to the
obviously less satisfactory claim that good
poker playing comes from good Monop-
oly playing. To most people feelings, per-
sonalities, intelligence, and the like, ifnot
explicitly termed types or qualities ofbe-
havior, often seem to be something else.
Such things are then easily mistaken for
causes of behavior.
Insisting that we call "mental events"
by the name "behavior" should not be
done to diminish the interest in these so-
called mental events, any more than call-
ing a public behavior in a behavior-be-
havior relation by the name "behavior"
should be done to diminish interest in
public behavior. Behavioral scientists
should call events "behavior" to keep
clear the fact that it is their job to explain
such events and to avoid incomplete ac-
counts based on these events.
A brief summary seems in order. The
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purpose of this paper has been to place
the behavior-analytic rejection ofmental
causes into the larger context ofthe goals
of science embraced by behavior analy-
sis. Both critics and supporters ofbehav-
ior analysis seem at times to confuse the
various reasons for the behavior-analytic
concern with mentalism. Literal dualism
is rejected because it is scientifically un-
tenable and because it leaves claimed
sources of control over behavior outside
the scientific enterprise. This rejection of
literal dualism, however, is common to
virtually all scientific forms of psychol-
ogy. The rejection of mentalism on the
grounds of the requirements of scientific
method, as done by early forms ofmeth-
odological behaviorism, is not recog-
nized as legitimate by radical behavior-
ism. Neither is the attempt to define away
the independent existence of private
events, as in Watsonian metaphysical be-
haviorism. What, then, is unique about
the radical behavioral rejection of men-
talism?
Our point has been that the primary
radical behavioral objection to mental-
ism (other than literal dualism) is a meta-
theoretical one. Nondualistic analyses
based on mental causality usually boil
down either to pseudophysiologizing, to
theorizing based on hypothetical con-
structs, or to elevating disguised behav-
ior-behavior relations to causal status.
The concern with all of these maneuvers
is that they interfere with the behavior-
analytic agenda of predicting and con-
trolling behavior. As we have tried to
show, this agenda is not an arbitrary ele-
ment ofbehavior analysis. It is a required
element for the successful functioning of
the perspective. Thus, mental causality
is a form of theorizing rejected because
its pursuit threatens the successful op-
eration of science as viewed from the
standpoint of behavior analysis.
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF NON-
MANIPULABLE CAUSES
We believe that much of the criticism
of the behavioral approach arises from a
failure to recognize its goals and the rea-
sons for them. Other goals or values make
alternative practices and beliefs justifia-
ble, and with these we can have no quar-
rel, provided only that the researcher
honestly states what these goals are. For
example, if a particular field of psychol-
ogy wishes to eschew control as the end
product of science, it has the obligation
to make that clear to all, whether the per-
son is a psychologist, a client seeking help,
a congressman, or a taxpayer helping fund
federal research.
We see no relative disadvantage for a
radical behavioral approach when pre-
diction and control are being pursued.
We do not mean to say, of course, that
research generated by nonbehavioral
psychologists necessarily results in in-
complete analyses as viewed from a con-
textualistic perspective. See, for example,
Ornstein and Naus's (1978) demonstra-
tion that recall was increased after the
manipulation of environmental events
controlling overt rehearsal. We must
guard against responding to the quality
of language rather than to the quality of
the analysis. The issue is not theform of
science but its function. It is the quality
of the analysis that is at issue rather than
an attempt to urge that some simple
physical correspondence exists between
private and public behaviors.
Examples of the Danger
Behavioral analyses that implicate
"covert behavior," rather than "mental
events," are equally incomplete if they
fail to extend the analysis to environ-
mental variables. Indeed, there are sev-
eral topics within behavior analysis that
share with mentalistic accounts some of
the same potential metatheoretical prob-
lems of encouraging incomplete ac-
counts.
Self-rules. There can be little doubt that
humans talk to themselves. Presumably,
these verbal events can relate in reliable
ways to other behavior. To explain other
behavior simply in terms of "self-rules,"
however, is not adequate behavior-ana-
lytic explanation. As in the cases dis-
cussed earlier, the term "self-rules" does
not obviously place these events in the
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same category as "behavior." Thus, when
talking of a relation between a self-rule
and behavior, it is not always obvious
that it is a behavior-behavior relation that
is at issue. Because it is, we must explain
both how external events gave rise to the
private talk, and how the private talk
came to control the behavior of interest.
When this is done, "self-rules" may par-
ticipate in an overall causal relation, but
they should not themselves be seen as
causes.
When behaviorists say they have lo-
cated a "cause," it seems they should have
identified a relation that can perform the
functions required ofa scientific relation
within a behavioral perspective, namely,
prediction and control. In a sense, causes
are not objective independent facts in the
world. All events in a thoroughgoing con-
textualistic system are "events" only be-
cause construing them that way serves a
purpose. A causal relation can only be
tested as a verbal construction, and only
when this verbal statement of a relation
serves the purposes of science should it
be called a "cause." Perhaps when we
have finished a complete analysis of a
behavior-behavior relation, we could
think of the first behavior as a kind of
"intermediate cause" (e.g., see Skinner's
reluctant agreement on this point, 1984),
but it is surely safer not to do so. Some
other term is needed. "Controlling be-
havior" suggests itself because of Skin-
ner's use ofthe term to serve this function
in his analysis of self-control. For ex-
ample, self-rules might be said to func-
tion as controlling behaviors as parts of
an overall causal relation. They are not
themselves causes, at least not in the be-
havior-analytically acceptable sense ofthe
word "cause."
Response-produced stimuli. At times,
behaviorists have used the term "re-
sponse-produced stimuli" to explain be-
havior-behavior relations. The apparent
effects of private behaviors on other be-
haviors may be explained on this basis.
For example, we may say that a person
visualizes one's bedroom, and due to the
stimuli produced by this behavior, re-
members where the car keys were left.
Even ifthe analysis avoids the idea ofan
image seen (in favor of the more "be-
havioral" term "response-produced
stimuli") it is troublesome.
Responses obviously usually produce
stimuli. For example, all operants, by
definition, do so. The concept of re-
sponse-produced stimuli, however, is
usually invoked when there is no possi-
bility of discerning or manipulating the
stimuli independently ofthe behavior it-
self. The danger is that, because stimuli
are apparently in a different class than
behavior, explanations based on "re-
sponse-produced stimuli" will be ac-
cepted as complete even when we have
in principle no hope of manipulating or
even discerning these stimuli indepen-
dently. Explanations are not complete
under these conditions. We move no
closer to prediction and control simply
by replacing a behavior-behavior rela-
tion with a "behavior-response-pro-
duced stimuli-behavior" relation unless
we have independent access to the stim-
uli. It is useless to "explain behavior by
appealing to independent variables which
have been inferred from the behavior thus
explained" (Skinner, 1969, p. 264). The
radical behavioral objection to hypo-
thetical constructs (when they are used
as other than merely a shorthand for be-
havior) has the same metatheoretical ba-
sis as the primary objection to mental-
ism. In some cases, "response-produced
stimuli" can have the status of a purely
hypothetical construct.
This objection does not necessarily
mean that we should stop using the term
"response-produced stimuli." We should
distinguish, however, between three types
of situations. In the first, the "stimuli"
referred to are clearly in the domain in
which control is possible in principle. An
ordinary operant is an example. A key-
peck that produces food is producing
food-related stimuli. That is presumably
why this behavior occurs in the first place.
We could speak of the food as response-
produced stimuli. In this case, we are us-
ing the term "response-produced stim-
uli" in a manner totally consistent with
the goals of science as seen by behavior
analysts because we can manipulate these
stimuli independently from the behavior
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that produced them and discern their ef-
fects on behavior.
In the second situation, the stimuli
cannot currently be controlled due to
technical limitations, but control is pos-
sible in principle. Analyzing back-
scratching in terms of sensory reinforce-
ment maybe an example. Here, when we
claim that the back scratch is due to re-
sponse-produced stimuli we are engaging
in interpretation, and in the future we
may or may not find the interpretation
to have provided a complete account. We
may ultimately find ways to block the
suggested sensory stimulation and to dis-
cern the effects of this manipulation.
Finally, there are times when direct
control is impossible in principle. A claim
that we have unconscious thoughts and
that these produce stimuli might be an
example. Here, we are using the term
"response-produced stimuli" solely to
provide a consistent account, but at a
considerable cost. We have disguised an
analysis that cannot in principle meet all
the goals of science from a behavior-an-
alytic viewpoint in the cloak of termi-
nology that suggests these goals can be
met.
Behaviors as self-reinforcers. Even rad-
ical behaviorists sometimes claim that
one behavior can be maintained by the
person involved providing other behav-
iors as "self-reinforcers" (e.g., Malott, in
press). The task ofbehavior analysis must
be to explain both behaviors and their
relation. When the contexts giving rise to
such behavior-behavior relations have
been manipulated experimentally, how-
ever (e.g., Hayes, Rosenfarb, Wulfert,
Korn, & Zettle, 1985), the apparent in-
fluence ofself-reinforcing behaviors have
always resolved into the effects of envi-
ronmental events (Sohn & Lamal, 1982).
An example of an apparently causal
behavioral consequence is the Premack
principle. Superficially, this principle
seems to suggest that one behavior can
reinforce another in the same organism.
But if the external environment manip-
ulates the opportunity to engage in a par-
ticular behavior following another, then
this is not a simple behavior-behavior
relation. It is really best thought of as a
behavior-environmental restriction-
behavior relation.
The examples of self-rules, response-
produced stimuli, and self-reinforcement
show that behavior analysts are also sus-
ceptible to the tendency to dress up be-
havior-behavior relations in the cloak of
nonbehavioral events and then to forget
that they have done so. The cost of this
action is the same as the cost of mental-
istic talk or pseudophysiological talk-
incomplete analyses are inappropriately
accepted as complete and a resultant gap
in knowledge is produced.
CONCLUSION
An embrace ofmentalism is not a sure
road to an appreciation of the richness
ofprivate phenomena, and trivialization
is not the necessary result of behavioral
translation. Behavior analysts should re-
ject mentalistic terms precisely in order
to study the actual phenomena associ-
ated with them in a more thorough way
and in a way more satisfying to the goals
of science as viewed by behavior ana-
lysts. Allowing behavioral causes made
seemingly less incomplete by calling them
"mental" ultimately tends to stop causal
analysis before the point at which effec-
tive action is possible. We need to un-
derstand the actual phenomena pointed
to by mentalistic terms, or terms such as
self-rules or self-reinforcement for that
matter. The analytic discipline supplied
by the assumptions inherent in radical
behaviorism is needed most in exactly
such difficult endeavors, not in order to
pursue analytic discipline for its own sake,
but in order to develop a more thor-
oughly adequate explanation of human
behavior.
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